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Alternative Ways of Modernization
- Comparison
of Individual Societies as Nation States in 19th
and 20th Century Western Societies
I
The focus of this paper will be to examine, on the basis of a comparative
analysis of the Kuropean experience of modernization in the middle 19th
Century and early 20th Century, the basic theoretical assumptions of theories
of modernization and convergence of individual societies. As is well known,
these theories, seemingly derived from the European experience, have
assumed a universal unilinear trend of development concomitant with
modernization.
These theories have also assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that such
characteristics of modern society - as the rationality, nation-state and class
society
- derived from the specific Kuropean heritage of the combination
between the Judeo-Christian and Greek cultural heritage; the heritage of
political tribal tradition and structural pluralism, will be more or less
concomitant with the development of modernity and industrialization.
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But not only the experience of non-European societies but also that of
the different European societies indicates not only that these assump-
tions cannot be accepted in füll, but enables to go beyond some such
general concepts as tradition and historical experience to explain the
variability of processes of modernization.
It is by now, as against the assumptions of the earlier studies
of modernization, that there is no Single - but many different - roads
to modernization.
II
The studies of development and modernization that became,
fromthe Second World War, a major focus of research in most of
the social sciences in sociology, political science, economics, and
anthropology, heralded the revival of the interest in comparative
macro-sociological studies, inthe dynamics of a variety of civiliza-
tions with a strong focus on the relations and contrast between modern
and premodern Western and non-Western civilizations, and of the
historical process which constituted one of the major foci of classical
sociological theories.
The emphasis of this renewed macro-societal and comparative
interest was on how to "develop" the "underdeveloped" societies, and
engendered a whole spate of studies in all the social sciences, utilizing
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new analytical approaches and new methodological tools of inquiry
- post-Keynesian and econometric studies in economics, in attitude
studies, in survey research, in demographic and ecological research,
and in analyses in sociology and political science. This work also
linked up with some of the major theoretical developments in sociology
and political science, especially with the "systemic" approaches to
social and political life. The most influential of these systemic
approaches was, as indicated above, the structural-functional approach
developed in- sociology by Talcott Parsons and taken up and further
elaborated in political science by Gabriel ALmond, David Easton, and
others. These approaches defined societies or polities as Systems,
that is, as entities that have boundaries of their own and to distinguish
them fromtheir environments, which have mechanisms that maintain
such boundaries and assure their continuity.
This combination of developments in sociological theory with
research into the "Third World" reopened the major classical problems
of sociological theory. These included the characteristics and internal
dynamics of various types of societies, the nature of processes of
change and of the conditions of stability of such societies, the process
of transition from one type of society to another, and the extent to which
such transition evinces a discernible universal evolutionary tendency
from the simple to the complex. This analysis of historical process
came back to the forefront of sociological concern and theory.
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The research that developed out of these concerns and dominated
comparative studies in the social sciences in the 1950's and 1960's
attempted first of all to identify the differences between traditional
and modern societies. These were defined in many ways by using
sociodemographic indices such as urbanization, occupational structure,
spread of media of communication, and the like. They were also
defined in terms of structural differences - traditional societies being
characterized, to use ft.rson's terminology, by particularistic and
ascriptive criteria of role allocation, and modern societies by
universalistic and achievement criteria. These differences between
traditional and modern societies were couched in most of the studies
in terms of the respective ränge of systemic problems with which
they could cope or of the environments - both internal (social, cultural)
and external (technological, economic) - which they could "master!1
Fromthis perspective, traditional societies were perceived as
basically very restrictive and limited, whereas modern societies
were Seen as much more expansive and adaptable to a widening ränge
of internal and external environments and problems. Special emphasis
was given to the ability to cope with change in general, and with
economic development and industrialization in particular. The qualities
of modern life, such as rationality, liberty, or progress, with which
the classics of sociology were deeply concerned were here subsumed
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under these "expansive" "systemic" qualities of societies. Although
not entirely neglected, those other qualities of the modern order were
seen, or assumed, to follow naturally fromthe capacity to grow and
to absorb change.
The Vision of the historical process which was connected with
all these developments was very much in line with the classical
evolutionary one - stressing very much the passage of most societies
through relatively similar stages moving towards the common end
stage of modernity.
III
Fromthe early and, especially, the mid sixties, the momentum of
research as well as the development on the world scene gave rise to
far-reaching criticisms of these assumptions. These criticisms
arose from a variety of vantage points, and they touched not only on
the problems of development and modernization, but also on some
very central questions of sociological analysis. Behind much of the
debate there also loomed political and ideological differences, some-
times forcefully expressed. The two major foci of these criticisms
were the alleged ahistoricity and Europocentricity of this initial model
of modernization, and the closely connected doubts about the validity
of the tradition-modernity dichotomy.
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The allegation of the ahistoricity and Western centricity of this
model was developed in two concrete directions that bear directly on
the problem of the dynamics of civilizations. One such direction
pointed to a reappraisal of the importance of historical continuity in
shaping the contours of societal development.
While it would be out of place to analyze here in detail the whole
spate of criticisms of the theories of modernization and of the con-
vergence of industrial societies which have developed, it might be
worthwhile to point out some of the highlights. The most crucial
aspects of these criticisms have beenihe recognition, first, of the
systemic viability of the so-called transitional Systems; second,
the very closely related recognition of the importance of traditional
elements as well as, possibly, of various international factors in
shaping the contours of these regimes.
Perhaps one of the most important developments in this context
was the concept of "patrimonialism" to describe the political regimes
of some new states. The use of the term "patrimonial" to describe
many of the contemporary regimes pointed out the inadequaties of the
central concepts and assumptions in the major studies of modernization,
first by showing that many of these societies and states did not develop
in the direction of modern Buropean nation-states; second, by
demonstrating that these societies were not necessarily a "transitional"
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phase along an inevitable path to this type of modernity; third, by
indicating that there was nevertheless some internal "logic" in their
development; and last, by emphasizing that at least part of this logic
or pattern derived from the traditions of these societies themselves.
Thus, these criticisms of the initial model of modernization
stressed the importance of analyzing contemporary developments in
various societies in terms of their "unfolding" of the traditional forces
inherent in them, rather than their alleged movement toward a fixed
end-stage.
The other - and, in a sense, opposite
- direction that these
criticisms took tended to emphasize the unique historical experience
of the modern era. This approach, most clearly apparent in the works
of many modern Marxists or semi-Marxists, stressed that the
modernization process was not universal or inherent in the nature of
every society. Rather, it was stressed that it represented a unique
historical Situation connected with the various aspects of European
expansion, and especially with the expansion of capitalism, and of the
consequent establishment of a new international System composed of
hegemonous and dependent societies.
Out of the latter there developed the strong stress on the necessity
to analyze different modern and modernizing societies from the point of
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view of their place in the international world (especially capitalist)
System and to see how their place in this System influences their
institutional contours and dynamics.
IV
Out of all these developments there emerged the recognition
of the possibility of a new perspective on the historical process in
general and processes of modernization in particular.
The Single most important aspect of the new perspective on
the historical process is the recognition of the fact that the institu¬
tional dynamics of societies are greatly shaped by their specific
historical experience and that, in the shaping of such historical
experience, two aspects seem to be of Special importance: one are
their cultural traditions and the other is their political-ecological
settings in general and their place in the respective international
System or Systems in which they participate, in particular.
Such a new perspective was made possible by the reexamination
of several central theoretical issues - the two most important, in the
present context, and both of which were examined in previous
research, were the reappraisal of the nature of tradition and its
place in social life; and the analysis of international relations and
Systems.
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The concept of tradition, which initially was in many works used
as a sort of a general residual category to explain major aspects of
institutional structures which could not be explained in terms of tue
premises of the initial model of modernization, became defined in a
more specific way; the different aspects of tradition became differen-
tiated and their relations to concrete institutional patterns specified.
It was shown that in most general terms tradition is perhaps best
viewed as the process
-
or at least part of the process
- through which
different levels of aspects of reality are culturally and socially
constructed and transmitted in society; i. e., as the reservoir of the
most central social and cultural experience of a society or civilization.
This reservoir of experience is not, however, some sort of general,
undifferentiated "störe"; it is rather composed of several components -
the relations between which are complex and often paradoxical.
The most important of these components are: first, some
generalized modes or orientations of perception and evaluation of the
modes of perception of social reality of the cosmic and of the socio-
political order, which, for convenience, we shall call cultural "codes".
Second are the Symbols of collective identity and third the major modes
of legitimation of the social and political order.
One of the most important findings of our research was that these
different aspects of tradition can change in different tempos. It was
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found, paradoxically enough, that the different cultural orientations
tend to be more continuous than the symbols and "contents" of collective
identity, even if the latter often are seen as more stable and continuous.
Second, this analysis has indicated how these codes influence and
shape some very basic parts of the social structure. We were able to
indicate in a systematic way
- beyond rather vague indications found
in the earlier literature on traditions or in sociological analysis
- which
aspects of the institutional structure which cannot be fully explained in
terms of levels of technological development or of structural differen-
tiation and specialization, are influenced by such codes. The most
important among these are: structure of authority; conception of
justice; the structure of power and of political struggle; principles
of social hierarchization; the definition of the scope of membership
•
of different communities - all of which greatly influence the major types
and policies undertaken in any society, and the perception of social
Problems within them.
Accordingly such conceptions do also greatly influence the modes
of the Integration
- moral, legal or communicative
- of the societies in
which they are prevalent and the major patterns of their legitimation.
Such cultural premises do also greatly influence the "worlda of
knowledge", the basic cognitive symbols prevalent in different societies;
as well as the process of institutionalization of cognitive institutional
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activities and attitudes in general and scientific in particular in different
societies.
Third, these conceptions
- and their institutional derivatives -
are "carried", by Special type of social actors and social mechanisms
-
especially by several types of cultural, educational and political elites
and frameworks - and may, often, cut across different "concrete"
societies. They do also often exhibit dynamics of their own.
The major characteristic of such actors and especially the degree
of their institutional autonomy, their internal solidarity and their
relations to broader strata are of crucial importance for understanding
the ways in which different cultural orientations shape the major
aspects of institutional frameworks.
Fourth, this research has indicated that many cf these institu¬
tional aspects seem to be continuous across different historical
settings; across changes in levels of technological development and
is closely related to continuities in some basic social and cultural
orientations and to the construction of their traditions even in modern
settings.
Fifth, our research has also indicate"d in a systematic way that
the very process of institutionalization of the cultural orientations
generates potentialities for tensions, conflicts and change. These
potentialities are rooted first in the contradictions that develop within
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the Systems or sets of codes themselves; second, in their application
to broad institutional complexes; and third, inthe differences between
various complexes of codes and various types of institutions and
interests. Because of this the tendency to tensions, conflicts and
Protest is inherent in human societies and it influences the patterns
of organizational and symbolic dimensions of social change. This
tendency appears in different patterns of'rebellion, social conflicts
and heterodoxies, the constellations of which vary greatly between
different societies and which greatly influence their Special historical
experience and dynamics of each of them.
But the concretization of these various tendencies takes place in
different political-ecological settings. Here of Special importance are
two aspects of such settings. One, very strongly stressed in recent
researches has been the importance of international political and
economic Systems in general and of the place of different societies
within them, and of different types of relations of hegemony and
dependency in particular. Second was the more general recognition
of a great variety of different political-ecological settings of societies
- such as differences between small as against large societies, their
respective dependence on internal or external markets and the like.
Both these aspects influence greatly the ways in which the
institutional contours and dynamics of different societies tend to develop.
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In all these ways our research has attempted to analyze how the
great variety of historical experience and of the traditions
of different
societies and civilizations has influenced the ways in which they shape
their ways and destinies in the modern world .
In this way the
researches have enabled a reappraisal of the processes of develop-
ment and modernization in general and on the problems of convergence
and divergence of modern and modernizing societies in particular.
V
In most of the literature this new perspective has been mostly
applied to non-Western societies, showing how the assumptions derived
from the western roots of modern social science are not easily applicable
to non-Western societies. Such reappraisal should, however, also be
attempted with respect to Western societies themselves enabling
a more
differentiated approach to them and to their proper place in comparative
framework.
The starting point of such a reappraisal should be the analysis
of the specific combination of cultural orientations and structural
characteristics of (Western) Ruropean societies themselves.
European civilization was characterized by a very high degree of
multiplicity and cross-cutting of cultural orientations and structural
settings. The symbolic pluralism or heterogeneity of European society
was evident in the multiplicity of traditions out of which its own cultural
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tradition crystallized - the Judeo-Christian, the Greek, the Roman,
and the various tribal ones - and in the concomitant multiplicity of
cultural codes and orientations. The most important among these
orientations or codes was the emphasis on a high autonomy of the
cosmic, cultural, and social Orders and a high level of mutual relevance
between them which was defined in terms of the tension between the
transcendental and the mundane order; the multiplicity and complexity
of the different ways of resolving this tension, either through worldly
(political and economic) or otherworldly activities.
The second cultural orientation prevalent in European civilization
was a high level of activism and commitment of broader group and
strata to these orders. Third was the conception of a high degree of
relatively autonomous access of different groups and strata to these
orders - to some degree countered by, and in constant tension with,
the strong emphasis on the mediation of such access by such bodies as
the Church or the political powers, Fourth was the definition of the
individual of an autonomous and responsible entity with respect to
access to these orders.
This multiplicity of symbolic orientations became connected with
a very Special type of structural-organizational pluralism in Burope.
This type of pluralism differed greatly fromthe one that developed,
for instance, in the Byzantine Empire, which shared many aspects of
its cultural traditional modeis with Western Europe. Within the Byzantine
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Empire this pluralism was manifest in a relatively high degree of
structural differentiation within a rather unified sociopolitical frame-
work in which different social functions were apportioned to different
groups of social categories. The structural pluralismthat developed
in Kurope was characterized, above all, by a strong combination between
lower - but continuously increasing
- levels of structural differentiation
on the one hand and continuously changing boundaries of different
collectivities, units, and frameworks on the other.
Between these collectivities and units there did not exist a clear-cut
division of labor. Rather there tended to develop among them a continuous
competition over their respective standing with respect to the different
attributes of social and cultural order, over the Performance of the
major societal functions
- be they economic, political or cultural, as
well as over the very definition of the boundaries
of ascriptive communities,
The combination of these symbolic modeis and structural conditions
generated several basic institutional characteristics of
traditional European
civilization. The most important among them were: (a) multiplicity of
centers; (b) a high degree of permeation of the peripheries by the centers
and of impingement of the peripheries on the centers; (c) a relatively
small degree of overlapping of the boundaries of class, ethnic, religious,
and political entities and their continuous restructuring; (d) a comparatively
high degree of autonomy of groups and strata and of their access
to the
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centers of society; (e) a high degree of overlapping among different
Status units combined with a high level of countrywide Status ("class")
consciousness and political activity; (f) multiplicity of cultural and
"functional" (economic, or Professional) elite, a high degree of
cross-cutting between them and close relationship between them, and
broader, more ascriptive strata; (g) relative autonomy of the legal
System with regard to other interpretiere Systems - above all the'
political and the religious ones; and (h) the high degree of autonomy
of cities as autonomous centers of social and structural creativity and
identity formation.
In close relation to Hiese institutional features of traditional
Buropean civilization there also developed in Burope Special patterns
of change. These patterns were characterized by: (a) high degree of
predisposition of secondary elites, relatively close to the center, to be
the major carriers of religious heterodoxies and political innovations;
(b) a relatively close relationship between these secondary elites within
broader social strata, and hence also to movements of rebellion; (c) a
concomitant predisposition to develop on the part of these elites and
groups
- and often also to combine - activities oriented to center
formation with those of institution building in the economic, cultural,
and educational spheres.
Out of these qualities of European civilization there developed
two major characteristics which persisted to the present. First, was
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the continuous confrontation between the construction of centers and the
process of Institution building. Institution building in most spheres was
seen as very relevant to the construction of centers and judged according
to its contribution to the basic premises of these centers, while at the
same time centers were also judged according to their capacity to
promote such just and meaningful institutions. Second was the continuous
competition between different groups or strata and elites about their
access to the construction of these centers.
The combination of these orientations with the patterns of change
that developed in Burope explain also the overall pattern of develop-
ment of Buropean civilization. As compared with the other great
Christian civilizations - the Byzantine, later the Russian ones -
"Western" Europe was distinguished by much less stability of regimes,
by continuous changes of boundaries, regimes, and collectivities; but at
the same time it evinced also a much greater degree of capacity of
institutional innovation cutting across different political and "national"
boundaries and centers, but at the same time continuously restructuring
these centers.
It was from within this setting that the push to modernity developed
in Burope
- a push which was characterized by the restructuring of
political centers, and of the conceptions of religious and cultural
premises and by the concomitant development of capitalism. In the
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development of all these aspects of modern Buropean civilization,
Protestantism constituted a very important solvent. Its potentialities
as such a solvent were rooted first in some of its basic cultural
orientations - above all, its great stress on the tension between the
transcendental order and the social and political ones and on their
mutual relevance; on the possibility - even necessity - to resolve this
tension through this worldly activities and on the direct, unmediated
access of individuals and communities, to the major attributes of the
transcendental and the social order.
But these potentials of Protestantism could only become effective
in the transformation of European civilization, first, insofar as
Protestantism evinced all the characteristics of the European movements
of heterodoxy and rebellion - the closed relations between secondary elites
and broader strata and the combination of orientations to the restructuring
of centers together with a very strong emphasis on institution building,
and on the continuous interrelation between these two.
Second, these transformative potentials of Protestantism tended
to develop, above all, in settings in which some of the major aspects
of structural pluralism were most developed. It was in such settings
as England, Holland, Switzerland, to a smaller degree in the Scandinavian
countries, and initially also in France that the solvent created by
Protestantism was crucial in transforming the European Society in
404
line with its basic cultural and institutional characteristics, but going
beyond the concrete way in which they crystallized in the more tradi-
tional (medieval) settings.
In the formation of centers the most important aspect of such
transformation was, first, the incorporation of orientations of protest
and of heterodoxy, as they developed in the Reformation into central
Symbols of society, thus creating the Special revolutionary premises
of modernity; and, second, the restructuring of basic cultural premises
of Buropean society in the direction of "secular" cultural traditions.
In the sphere of Institution building Protestantism intensified the
motivational commitments to economic, scientific, and political
activities and to the sanctification and legitimation of such institution
building in terms of the basic premises of the system, often seeing them
as directly representing them.
It was out of the development s briefly analyzed above that some
of the major characteristics as well as problematics of the further
development of European civilization and modernity crystallized.
The central initial focus or premise of European modernity has
been, as has so often been stressed in the literature, that the explöra-
tion of continuously expanding human and natural environments and
destiny and their directions, and even mastery, can be attained by the
conscious effort of man and society. Bs central premise was the
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possibility of active formation of crucial aspects of social, cultural,
and natural Orders by conscious human activity and participation.
The füllest expressions of this attitude could be found in the break-
through of science and of the scientific approach into the Parameters
of the cultural order; that is, in the premises that the exploration of
nature by man is an "open" enterprise which creates a new cultural
order and that the continuous expansion of scientific and technological
knowledge could transform both the cultural and social Orders and
create new, external and internal environments endlessly explored
by man - and at the same time harnessed to his social, cultural,
intellectual vision and technical needs.
Accordingly, there developed in modern Europe attempts at the
formation of a "rational" culture, efficient economy, civil (class)
society, and nation-state within all of which the tendencies of rational
expansion of all aspects of cultural and social life could become fully
articulated. These attempts were based on several assumptions which
can be seen as the transformation, in modern settings, of the basic
orientations and problematics of European tradition.
VI
It was indeed against the background of these symbolic and
structural characteristics of European civilization that there tended
to develop the specific conditions which facilitated its modern
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transformation. This transformation was greatly facilitated by the
specific structure and orientations of the more influential Protestant
groups
- especially by the fact that they were secondary, mostly
non-political elites, which combined a strong orientation to political
center with autonomous access to it, as well as their specific
religious-transcendental orientations. These characteristics have
been decisive in enabling them to develop
- after the failure of their
initial totalistic efforts to establish a new religious society
- in the
this-worldly direction which could also influence the broader trends
of change of European modernity and of the combination of these codes,
orientations and structural characteristics of European society on the
one hand and the transformative potentials of the various religious
(Protestant) groups on the other. There developed, in many parts
of Europe, a high degree of congruence between the cultural and the
political identities of territorial population; two, a high level of
symbolic and effective commitment to political and cultural centers,
including a close relation between these Centers and the more primordial
dimensions of human existence; and, three, a narked emphasis on
common political.defined collective goals for all members of the
national Community.
It was out of these assumptions that some of the specific proposi-
tions about patterns of participation and protest of the nation-state
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and the close relations between the nation-state and class-Society
developed. The most important of these assumptions were:
that both political groups and more autonomous social forces
and elites crystallize in relatively antithetic, autonomous yet
complementary "units" or "forces" of "State" and "Society";
that those continuously struggle to gain ascendency at the
cultural and political center of the nation-state and the regulation
of access to it; that the various processes of structural change
and as a result of processes of modernization
-
gave rise, not
only to various concrete problems and demands, but also to a
growing quest for participation in the broader social and political
order; and
that this quest for participation of the periphery in such social,
political and cultural Orders is mostly manifest in the search for
access to these centers.
VII
While these characteristics were common to all European societies
yet there developed among them also a very great variability. This
variability in different European societies in the two historical periods
indicates not only changes and differences in the tempo of industrialization
in the extension of political rights and in the formation of political unites,
but also in the basic institutional features of the institutional formats
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specific to the European experiences. The most important differences
are in the definition of the political Community and its relation to
national, religious and regional countries; in the structure of power
and of access to it; in the forms and expressions of class conflict;
in the definition of meaning of specifically modern institutions.
Among the most important aspects of such variability is that
in the relations between the formation of the nation-state and of class
-
societies. These two have been very often analyzed as if they were
concretely and analytically two distinct movements. But in fact they
are very closely related and interrelated
- and the specific mode
of structuring of social hierarchies
- which has been designated as
modern class-consciousness and movements - can be understood,
as we have indicated above, only through their interrelations with the
processes of formation of nation-states and their centers
as they
developed in the peculiar European or Western fashion.
Hence also the differences in the working out of such relations
in different European countries can be attributed to different cons-
tellations of the following major factors: different cultural orientations
and emphases within the common framework of the European heritage;
the structure of the major cultural, political and social elite groups;
the different political-ecological constellations in the framework of
the emerging multiple international Systems.
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VIII
We shall illustrate this point by going beyond Europe, not
to non-Western societies, but to one of the major "offshoots" of
Europe
- the United States, and by Coming back to the question
asked by Werner Sombart in the beginning of this Century why is
there no socialism in America. The answer Sombart gave to his
question was, as is well known, that there is no socialism in
America basically because it is a very mobile open society,
frontier society. But Sombart's answer cannot explain very well
why there was a very interesting, even if not a European type
of socialist movement in Argentina, a country in which the late
nineteenth Century and early twentieth Century there was no less
mobility than in the U.S. Even stronger is the paradox with
respect to Australia which is also a Continental nation and
which is yet a country with a very strong socialist tradition.
For these reasons also Louis Hartz's explanation of the lack
of a liberal and socialist tradition in the U.S. as due to its
never being a feudal society is, at best only partially true.
It is, of course, true that the egaliterian movements develop
more fully against the background of a hierarchical society.
But what is of crucial importance for our analysis is that this
background has been relevant in the U.S., not only with respect
to class-relation, but also with respect to
the very formation.of its political collective identity,
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of its statehood, of the specific type of nation-state that
developed in America. 61 Kurope the processes of building nation-
states and of structuring of social hierarchies were continuously com-
bined against its hierarchical-pluralistic bäckground. Here the
crucial fact with respect to the United States has been the common
political framework and common identity of the American peo£Le,
based on any historical experience with a hierarchical and primordial
background in the sense in which it has been the case in many Buropean
countries. U. S. is a civilization which was based on a political
transformation of a religious experience
- a unique thing in the
history of mankind. The Founding Fathers
- those giants to which
he was referring to before
- were the carriers of a very interesting
process of transformation which created a new civilization. Among
the Special features of this civilization I could like to emphasize two.
One is the emergence of what Robert Bellah
has called the civil
religion in America. It was a civilization which developed
a civil
religion and whose common identity was focused around that civil
religion. And I want to emphasize both words
- both civil and religion
-
without the two being necessarily a contradiction. ß is this combination
that is a very important clue to understanding the unique aspects of
American experience.
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The second feature of this civilization is, as Tocqueville has
emphasized, in the idea and ideology of equality. It was the first
modern society whose collective identity was not related and was not termed
in any hierarchical terms; in which the problems of the
hierarchical
orders of the society were not related to the problems of the constitution
of the body polity
- just as it was not related to a common historical
origin, to common historical memory, mythical or actual.
I think this
unique combination of civil regime and of a strong emphasis on equality
gives the füll answer to Sombart's question, and helps
us to put the
American experience in the framework of a comparative analysis of
Western societies - a framework which could
- and should - be extended
to the analysis of different European societies.
